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Why	Brexit	could	hit	productivity	in	the	UK
UK	economic	performance	has	been	poor	since	the	vote	to	leave	the	EU	in
June	2016,	but	has	not	been	the	catastrophe	that	many	predicted.	Nicholas
Bloom	(Stanford	–	on	left)	and	Paul	Mizen	(Nottingham	University)	draw
four	results	from	the	evidence	gathered	in	the	new	Decision	Maker	Panel
survey	of	around	2,500	businesses	in	the	UK.	While	most	firms	expect	a
negative	impact	of	Brexit	on	sales,	investment	and	costs,	only	larger	firms
and	those	that	are	more	exposed	to	international	markets	are	likely	to	think
that	they	might	move	part	of	their	business	abroad.
First,	we	should	do	something	economists	need	to	do	more	often	–	apologise	for	making	bad	predictions.	In
advance	of	the	June	2016	referendum	on	Brexit,	one	of	us	in	particular	–	Nicholas	Bloom	–	predicted	a	collapse
in	investment	and	growth.	Thankfully,	so	far	this	has	yet	to	happen.	Yes,	Brexit	had	lowered	growth	–	UK	growth
rates	are	now	falling	and	about	0.5%	lower	versus	trend	compared	to	Europe	and	the	US	(see	Figure	1).	But
there	has	not	been	the	catastrophic	growth	collapse	we	feared	(e.g.	Dhingra	et	al.	2016)	–	at	least	not	yet.
Figure	1	UK	growth	versus	the	rest	of	the	G7	economies
Notes:	Plots	the	two	quarter	moving	average	of	UK	growth	less	the	average	of	the	growth	rates	in	the	other	six	G7	economies	(Canada,
France,	Germany,	Italy,	Japan	and	the	US).
Four	reasons	have	saved	the	UK	from	a	more	serious	post-Brexit	growth	collapse.	First,	the	pound	fell	about	20%
after	Brexit,	while	access	to	the	EU	markets	has	been	maintained,	providing	a	temporary	honeymoon	for
exporters.	Second,	growth	in	the	Eurozone	has	been	rising,	boosting	demand.	Third,	monetary	policy	has
loosened	with	lower	interest	rates.	Finally,	growth	expectations	of	the	approximately	half	of	the	voters	supporting
Brexit	have	remained	strong.
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But	what	now	–	is	the	Brexit	collapse	about	to	happen,	or	will	economic	growth	remain	lower	but	not	disastrous,
or	maybe	growth	will	now	accelerate	as	some	Brexit	supporters	claim?	A	year	on	we	are	in	better	shape	to
assess	the	evidence.	In	collaboration	with	the	Bank	of	England,	we	have	worked	to	set	up	a	new	Decision	Maker
Panel	survey	of	about	2,500	UK	firms	(Bloom	et	al.	2017).	Each	month	we	ask	panel	members	made	of	CFOs
and	CEOs	from	a	broad	range	of	UK	companies	about	their	current	business	conditions.	We	ask	for	their	data	on
past	growth,	current	levels,	and	possible	future	changes	(with	the	probabilities	they	ascribe	to	each)	in	three
areas:	investment	and	borrowing;	employment	and	costs;	and	sales	and	prices.	We	also	have	a	few	one-off
questions	on	the	possible	impact	of	Brexit	on	business	conditions.
This	has	revealed	four	results	about	the	impact	of	Brexit.
1.	Brexit	is	a	major	source	of	uncertainty	for	firms
In	August	2016	in	response	to	the	question:	‘How	much	has	the	result	of	the	EU-referendum	impacted	the	level	of
uncertainty	affecting	your	business?’	more	than	one	third	of	CEOs	and	CFOs	cited	Brexit	as	at	least	one	of	the
top	sources	of	uncertainty.	Indeed,	back	then	10%	said	that	Brexit	had	been	the	most	important	factor	and	25%
said	it	had	been	one	of	the	top	two	or	three	sources	of	uncertainty	(Figure	2).	Successive	waves	of	this	question
have	shown	that	firms	continue	to	place	Brexit	high	on	the	list	of	sources	of	uncertainty.	In	fact,	the	share	of	firms
placing	Brexit	in	the	top	drivers	of	uncertainty	has	risen	from	35%	in	August	2016	to	almost	40%	in	August	2017,
while	the	share	of	companies	considering	Brexit	not	important	almost	halved	in	the	same	period,	from	23%	to
12%.
Figure	2	Brexit	as	a	source	of	uncertainty
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Notes:	Results	are	from	the	Decision	Maker	Panel	survey	and	are	based	on	315	responses	in	Aug-16,	768	responses	in	Feb	to	Apr-17
and	414	responses	in	Aug-17.	Results	are	weighted	by	employment	size.
2.	Most	firms	expect	a	negative	impact	of	Brexit	on	sales,	investment
and	costs
Companies	believe	it	is	more	likely	than	not	that	Brexit	will	reduce	their	sales	and	investment,	and	increase	their
exports,	unit	costs,	labour	costs	and	financing	costs.	Figure	3	shows	the	net	probability	that	companies	attach	to
Brexit	having	a	positive	rather	than	a	negative	effect	on	each	variable.	According	to	our	survey	the	average
probability	attached	to	Brexit	increasing	sales	by	2020	was	20%,	while	the	average	probability	of	a	negative
impact	was	42%.	The	net	effects	shown	in	the	chart	below	is	a	net	balance	of	-22%	for	the	effect	of	Brexit	on
sales	by	2020.	It	means	that	companies	place	more	weight	on	Brexit	reducing	sales	than	on	increasing	them.
There	was	a	net	negative	expected	effect	on	investment,	and	a	positive	effect	pushing	up	unit	costs,	labour	costs
and	financing	costs.
Figure	3	The	expected	impact	of	Brexit
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Notes:	Results	are	from	the	Decision	Maker	Panel	survey	and	are	based	on	1036	responses	to	the	question	on	sales,	218	responses	to
the	question	on	exports,	1286	responses	to	the	question	on	investment,	525	responses	to	the	question	on	unit	costs,	738	responses	to
the	question	on	labour	costs,	548	responses	to	the	question	on	financing	costs.	Questions	were	asked	between	Oct-16	and	Aug-17.
Results	are	weighted	by	employment	size.
When	we	break	these	responses	down	by	firm	size,	we	find	larger	firms	are	more	pessimistic	about	the	impact	of
Brexit	than	smaller	firms.	These	firms	are	often	more	exposed	to	international	markets	than	smaller	firms,
although	many	small	firms	form	part	of	a	supply	chain	for	larger	firms.
3.	The	majority	of	firms	are	not	considering	moving	any	operations
abroad,	but	a	few	larger	firms	are
Most	firms	see	no	possibility	of	shifting	the	location	of	their	operations	abroad	–	many	have	no	presence	abroad
and	export	little	or	nothing.	Firms	accounting	for	80%	of	employment	attached	zero	probability	to	moving	any
operations.	Among	larger	firms	and	exporters,	however,	the	story	is	different.	Larger	firms	and	those	that	are
more	exposed	to	international	markets	were	more	likely	to	think	that	they	might	move	part	of	their	business
abroad	compared	to	firms	that	are	smaller	or	domestically	focused.	By	sector,	firms	in	manufacturing	were	most
likely	to	say	there	was	a	chance	of	moving.	Across	all	respondents,	the	average	(employment-weighted)
probability	of	moving	some	operations	abroad	was	7%,	with	companies	who	accounted	for	7%	of	employment
thinking	that	it	was	more	likely	than	not	that	they	would	move	some	operations	abroad	(Table	1).	These
probabilities	are	still	quite	small	at	this	stage,	but	not	negligible.
Companies	that	reported	higher	probabilities	of	moving	abroad	were	more	likely	to	expect	to	move	within	the	next
two	years,	before	the	UK	has	actually	left	the	EU,	whereas	those	reporting	lower	probabilities	were	less	likely	to
plan	on	moving	within	two	years.
Table	1	Probability	of	moving	some	operations	abroad
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4.	Exit	risks	lowering	aggregate	productivity	growth
The	higher	productivity	parts	of	the	country	voted	to	remain	in	the	EU	(Figure	4).	After	the	vote	in	the	referendum
they	became	less	optimistic	about	future	prospects	for	the	economy	(Figure	5),	and	have	likely	lowered
investment	and	employment	growth.
Figure	4	Productivity	by	Regional	Brexit	vote	share
Notes:	Results	are	from	the	Electoral	Commission	and	the	Bureau	van	Dijk	Fame	dataset	covering	14,896	UK	companies.	Total	factor
productivity	is	measured	as	a	natural	logarithm	of	profits	less	0.7*	the	log	number	of	employees	and	0.3*	log	of	tangible	assets
demeaned	at	the	industry	level.	The	productivity	measure,	which	is	based	on	2015	data	(2014	if	2015	not	available),	has	been
winsorized	at	the	1%	and	99%	to	reduce	the	impact	of	any	possible	outliers.	Results	for	average	wages	–	another	proxy	for	productivity
–	look	similar	across	regions.
Figure	5	Economic	optimism	by	regional	Brexit	vote	share
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Notes:	Results	are	from	the	Electoral	Commission	and	the	Decision	Maker	Panel	survey	based	on	606	responses	between	May-17	and
Jul-17.	Growth	rates	refer	to	the	difference	between	the	expected	and	current	level	of	capital	expenditure	in	terms	of	a	percentage	of
their	average	value.	The	investment	growth	rates	have	been	winsorized.	Results	are	weighted	by	employee	size.
In	contrast,	the	parts	of	the	country	that	were	in	favour	of	Brexit	had	lower	productivity	(Figure	4),	and	have
become	more	positive	about	future	prospects	since	the	vote	(Figure	5),	potentially	raising	investment	and
employment	growth.	If	this	leads	to	a	reallocation	of	investment	and	employment	from	higher	to	lower	productivity
parts	of	the	country,	it	could	reduce	UK	productivity	growth.
Authors’	note:	Principal	Investigators	Bloom	and	Mizen	have	received	£683,636	in	the	form	of	an	ESRC	standard	grant	for	“Measuring
the	Impact	of	Brexit	on	UK	Investment,	Productivity,	Sales	and	Employment”.	The	funding	will	support	an	online	survey	and	research
into	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	UK	for	three	years,	1	Sept	2017	–	31	August	2020.	The	project	is	carried	out	with	the	collaboration	of	HM
Treasury,	Bank	of	England,	the	Universities	of	Nottingham	(UK)	and	Stanford	(US).
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This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
VoxEU.
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